There is asensation both 01 arrival and 01prospect, so that one does indeed seem to 'recover a past and prejigure a future', and thereby to complete the circle %ne's being. 1
In bis Poetics Aristotle argues that mimesis is a capacity, or a potentiality, rooted in nature and realised by human nature as a congenital property of humankind's natural mode of constructing and inhabiting the universe. Thus understood mimesis is the origin of art as imitation. This ancient view of the origin and nature of art has been largely discredited in modern times. Yet Paul Ricoeur offers what I find to be a bold rehabiliat~on of Aristotle's doctrine of mimesis, as weil as a rereading of Imman':1el Kant. My contention is that Ricoeur aims to restore meaning to ae~thetic tradition and, at the same time, to signify something new in the :pregnant present vis-a-vis the immanent future. I intend to elucidate .the tensions between tradition and innovation in Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology.in order to un~over the precise nature of his aesthetic$.
From the outset we might wonder about the cogency of Ricoeur's aesthetics~niting as it does contlicting Aristotelian and post-Kantian traditions (including Hegel, possibly Schiller, Husserl and Arendt). In fact Ricoeur's account of the origin and nature of the work of art seems to exhibit an un-Aristotelian emphasis in that he introduces a post-Kantian account of the human imagination. Ricoeur connects nJimesis to a principle of the human cognitive project of reshaping reality modelIed on both Kant's category of productive imagination in the Crititjue of Pure Reason and Kant's idea of reflective judgement in the Critique 0/Judgement. However, potentially more problematic for many contemporary theorists is the fact that Ricoeur aims to restore meaning to the very aesthetic discourse which has become the~bject of modern and postmodern critiques. I need only mention any one of the various, equally radical, critiques posed by Marxists~poststructuralists and feminists of either Aristotelian metaphysics or Kantian aesthetics to recognise the formidable challenges which inevitably face Ricoeur's appropriation of these traditions. In order to address these potentially destructive criticisms I will reconstruct Ricoeur's aesthetics, taking into account his most recent work in Time and Na"dtive, and Soi-meme comme un autre.
To begin I need a frame of reference. I~is possible to recognise various aesthetic theories whieh have, in t~e course of Western intellectual history, constituted different accounts of what it is that all works of art share which gives them their valöe. In reeent discussions four elements have been distinguished as rele~ant for assessing a work of art: the work, the artist, the universe and the audience. Using these elements four main types of theories may be proposed. First, the mimetic theory is based upon the relation of the work of art to the universe; second, the expressive theory is based upon the relation of the work to the artist; third, the pragmatie theory is eoneerned with the relation of the work to the audience; fourth, the objective theory is coneerned solely with the relation of the work to itself as a purely autonomous object.
Consistent with my opening statement the mimetic theory explains art as essentially an imitation of aspects of the universe. This is probably the most primitive aesthetic theory. Yet the mimetic as weil as the expressive approaches to art have been intellectually delegitimated . by certain contemporary theorists. The deconstructionists insist that all there is is the autonomous work, i.e., the text imitates nothing outside itself; other postmodernists exhibit an overriding pragmatic concern with the affect upon the audience. Notwithstarlding these views a combination of a11 four theories informs Ricoeur's account of aesthetic value.
We can see this combination of elements by considering, however schematically, Ricoeur's account of mimesis 1·3. Mimesisl as the prefiguration of human action encompasses elements of bpth the mimetic and the expressive theories of aesthetics. It involves the structural, symbolic and temporal resources which make possible the poetic composition of a work. For instance the semantics of action, norms of society and circumstances of history would all be constitutive elements of prefiguration. To give the modern background to~lcoeur's aesthetics. I will acknowledge bis major debt to Kant who ofters the first intellectual definition of aesthetics as an autonomous field Qf pbilosophy. Admittedly Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62) and bis Aesthetica (1750-58) immediately predate Kant (1724-1801) and Jijs Critique 0/ Judgement (1790) . Writing prior to Kant Baumgarten defines aesthetics in terms of the appreh~nsion of sense phenomena; and he introduces concepts for evaluation of beauty as phenomenal perfection. However, Kant formulates the characteristically modern defi~tion of aesthetics as an autonomous dimension uniting two different aspects of conscious experience. Kant argues that the unifying act isperformed by the faculty of judgement, 'which in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a middle term between understanding and re~on'; such judgement is governed by independent and apriori principles'·which constitute aesthetics as a special dimension.? ;
Let us further recall Kant's position. After the first two critiques, in which Kant reveals the apriori foundations of knowledge and morality, respectively, there remains a task of not only unifying the critical project through a study of judgement, but also of demonstrating the legitimacy of judgements of taste, and in particular the type of reflective judgement characteristic of aesthetics. Kant ofters an analytic and a~eduction that demonstrates the apriori ground of trus distinctive type of judgement. Aesthetic judgements are not to be confused or identified with knowledge of the phenomenal world nor with the activity of pure practical reason. But this does not imply that such judgements are merely idiosyncratic. They make adefinite clainl to universality or, as Ricoeur stresses, communicability: a central theme in Kantian aesthetics [is] that communicability constitutes an intrinsie component of the judgement of taste.· And yet Kant stresses that "the judgement of taste... is not a cognitive judgement, and so not logical, but is aesthetic • which means that it is one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective... 9 Throughout Kant maintains a basic dichotomy between the subjective and the objective, although he transforrns the meaning of these terms. So conceived Ricoeur's restoration of aesthetic discourse gives value to both the temporal succession -found in Kant's account of human experience -and the dramatic unity -found in Aristotle's account of emplotment.
11 These two accounts are reflected in the configurational acts which incorporate, as a product of time, the story of a community.12 Moreover Ricoeur's hermeneutics of restoration endeavours to disclose the social implications of narrative configurations. Still we might question this position. One fundamental problem is that Ricoeur's configurational act aims to marry an historical account of Aristotelian mimesis -with the implicit relativism of an apparently archaie metaphysics -and the special cognitive values assigned to his post-Kantian rereading of nlinzesis. Granted Ricoeur's rehabiliation of Aristotle with its post-Kantian dimensions involves complex matters. Not the least of these matters are the difficulties which attend subject-orientated theories including, crucially, what guarantees the security and the authority of the cognitive categories of the knowing (Kantian) subjecl. Ricoeur bimself wrestles with this question of the subject in terms of narrative identity.16
An alternative reading of Ricoeur is through Husserl's later phenomenology, that is, through locating the knowing subject in the intersubjective relations of the social world. Here cognition, and hence mimesis, have their roots in what is humanly and socially shared; there is no symbolic creation which is not in the final analysis rooted in the common symbolical ground of humanity. And Ricoeur clearly owes a debt to the phenomenological tradition for elucidating the meaning of the Iived experiences of time. We will see that Ricoeur gives a further function to the imagination: in phenomenological terms imaginative variations make possible the opening up of actual and possible worlds.
For me a reading of Ricoeur sensitive to his continuing debt to Husserl as weil as to Kant -besides Aristotle -also makes sense of his original project in F~eedom and' Nature. Ricoeur's projeet for a philosophy of the will presupposes both Kant's conception of natural causality as a necessary objective order of temporal succession and Husserl's subjective analysis of internal-time consciousness. For instance, Time is the form according to which the present changes constantly as to its content... it is the order of succession of moments... should we say that the marks of subjectivity attach only to acts bound by the succession? [instead] succession represents the fundamental bipolarity of human existence... it is undergone and carried on}7
The above retleets Kantian and Husserlian presuppositions concerning the rational subject's relation to time. These presuppositions equally characterise the aporia of Tinte and Na"ative, III. It follows from Ricoeur's account of a' dual-aspect being that mimesis is a necessary function for mediation of freedom and necessity.
In order to see the development of this account of temporal experience for aesthetics let us turn to Soi-meme comme un autre. By confronting the problem of self j-:, t dty Ricoeur is able to recognise further aspects of human freedom aud natural necessity. For one thing, he places narrative activity in a position comparable to the fragile mediation between the extremes of infinitude and finitude which is described in Fallible Man. The significant contribution of Soi-meme to contemporary debates about personal identity is in drawing a post-Kantian distinction between being the same (idem) and being the seil-same (ipse). On this basis Ricoeur introduces narrative identity as a function of ipseite into the temporal milieu between permanence and change. 
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An objection to the coherence of my reading needs to be addressed. If compared with other reconstructions of Kant's contribution to contemporary aesthetic theory, Ricoeur's refusal to accept an aesthetic which depends upon a subjective account of individual genesis or taste may be thought to be contradictory. Notably Ricoeur conceives the aesthetic value of myth as the communal work of constructing an intelligible world, as a symbolic creation which is in the final analysis rooted in the common symbolic ground of humanity and as the symbolic exploration of our relationship to beings and to Being. 20 This conception is not able to be reconc:iled with aesthetic judgement defined -after Kant -as being subjective, disinterested, unconnected with desire, exclusive and serving no immediate practieal purpose. In faet Rieoeur brings into question this definition by elueidating the aesthetie value of myth in representing the mediation of tradition and innovation.
Generally speaking philosophers since Kant have been presented with a ehoice of possible paths. On the one hand, analytical philosophers may choose to support aesthetics as an autonomous discourse by declaring it out of bounds so far as politics, eulture and theory are concerned. In this ease one would make the obvious appeal to aesthetic disinterest, to what Kant expressly states about the character of art, rather 'than what the whole strueture of Kant's philosophy constrains him to imply. But a elose and consequent critique of, for instance, aesthetics in the analytical. tradition would no doubt show how real and pressing are the ideological interests that conceal themselves behind such talk of principled autonomy. To name a few ideologieal interests: there are questions of gender, race, ethnicity and class.
On the other hand philosophers • especially those so-called Continental -may take up the Kantian challenge, accepting the need for some articulated theory of aesthetics, politics and knowledge, though conscious of the difficulties that stand in the way of such a project. This project must inevitably: lead beyond aesthetics as such to a critical accounting of interests and truth-claims which would undermine its role as an autonomous discdurse.
I would insist that the originality of Ricoeur rests in his attempt to seek a mediating position between these two extremes. It is important to restate the problem which Ricoeur helps us to recognise in Kant's analysis of aesthetic judgement. Kant's problem is to explain how aesthetic judgement is related to a distinctive type of subjective aesthetic pleasure -distinct from other sorts of pleasure -and at the same time to account for the communal validity of such judgements. Kant states that the cognitive powers are in 'free play, since no definite concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition... This state of[ree play of the cognitive faculties attending a representation by which an object is given must admit of universal communication.'21 In other words Kant aims to demonstrate that aesthetic judgements are grounded in human subjectivity and yet are not merely relative to an individual subject. Taste is communal. not idiosyncratic.
I believe that a reading of Ricoeur forces us to confront the inconclusive conclusion of Kant's Critique of Judgement. This confrontation might be reduced to two questions: .does the universality of taste, once it is produced, turn out to be a natural and original property ot the human subject? or does the subject to which a universality of taste can appropriately be attributed turn out to be the product of a process of cultural and historical unification? And Ricoeur would seem • unwittingly or not • to have a response to these questions: he creatively preserves the tensions inherent in post-Kantian aesthetics.
On the one hand. with bis discussions of prefiguration Ricoeur must admit the dependency of artistic practices on historically variable social relations conditioning both the production of works of art and the manner in which they are socially circulated and received. On the other hand. as seen above the real work lies in elucidating those aspects of a narrative configuration which liberates the author/reader and makes possible the formal qualities of the configurating act as a retlective judgement. The most that the analysis of the social relations conditioning artistic practices might .accomplish is to account tor the varying ways in which tradition is mediated and so ceaselessly refigured. Thus we can see in answer to criticism mentioned at the outset of this paper that
We must challenge with equal force the thesis of a narrow structuralism which forbids Cmoving outside of the text' and that of a dogmatic Marxism which merely shifts onto the social plane the worn-out topos of imitatio naturae. It is on the level of a public's horizon of expectationsthat a work exercises... the Ccreative funclion of the work of art'... Ir a new work is able to create an aesthetic distance. it is because a prior distance exists between the whole of Iiterary Iife and everyday practice. It is a basic characteristic of the horizon of expectation of an even more basic noncoincidence, namely, the opposition in a given culture 'between poetic language and practical language, imaginary world and social reality'... What we have just indicated as Iiterature's function of social creation ariscs quite precisely at this point of articulation between the expectations turned toward art and literature and the expectations constitutive of everyday experience.
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The above also refleets Rieoeur's appropriation of effeetive history (Wirkungsgeschichte). This implies that insofar as we appropriate past experiences with an orientation to the future, the authentie present is preselVed as the locus of continuing tradition and of innovation; the one is not possible without the other. Both past and future, tradition and innovation, merge into the objectivity proper to a context of effective history. Of course as Ricoeur bimself reeognises there arp different ways of reading effective history aeeording to continuity and discontinuity. In particular Ricoeur differs from Michel Foucault on the question of discontinuity.23
The problem remaining for Ricoeur in the light of certain postmodern theorists is to maintain a meta-aesthetic discourse. Here his answer to the postmodern critic must be" in maintaining a productive relation between text and history, freedom and constraint, vision and debt. In his words, Free from the external constraint of documentary proof, fiction is bound internally by the very thing that it projects outside itself. Free from... artistS must still make themselves free for... If 'this were not the case, how could we explain the anguish and sufCering of artistic creation as they are attested to by the correspondence and diaries of a van Gogh or a C~zanne? ...the stringent law of creation, which is to render as perfectly as possible the vision of the world that inspires the artist, corresponds feature by feature to the debt of the historian and of the reader of history wilh respect to the dead... The freedom of the imaginative variations is communicated only by being cloaked in the constraining power oe aVISIon of the world. Thc dialectic between freedom and constraint. intel~i.!l 10 thc crcative process. is thus transmitted throughout the hermeneutical process.34
Frnm this I eonelude that Ricoeur's discourse on aesthetics culminates in a creativelhermeneutical process. This would be consistent witb, for instance, a claim of the }Juetess Veroniea Forrest-Thomson:
if poetry is to justify itself ... it must articulate the already-known and subject it to a reworking which suspends aod questions i15 categories. provides allernative orderings.25
In dialectically relating tradition and innovation Ricoeur ofters an aesthetics wbich constitutes and is constituted by the possibility of a poetic refiguration. As we have seen Ricoeur's position is not merely to re-assert an Aristotelian or a post-Kantian aesthetics; yet bis constant aim is to restore meaning to both these traditions. Such restoration does nil'~nstitute a facile project. Instead it encourages an active engagement with various critiques of aesthetic tradition, including Marxist, structuralist and postmodernist critiques. This engagement is productive insofar as Ricoeur's threefold mimesis of prefiguration, contiguration and refiguration retlects an endeavour to rework accepted categories in order to signify something new in the pregnant present vis-a-vis the immanent future.
Thus I see in Ricoeur's aesthetics t~, vision of arrival and of prospect:
.,ntial for that poetic to 'recover a past and prefigure a future: and thereby to complete the circle of one's being.
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